Battle of Lyte Gulf
Much has been written regarding the important factors in war from logistics, intelligence, command and control to strategy and tactics .A subject that has been neglected is the psychological makeup of the commanders of major units.Sun Tze was aware of this factor as in his writings he has a section concerning preparation for war where he emphasizes the importance of knowing not only your enemy but also of one’s self. The second world war seems to have been the last conflict where commanders where given unlimited reign to express their individual personality, much more than today where commanders do not have the benefit of a publicity machine.
General Douglas Mac Arthur admirals had personalities which greatly affected the course of WWII; for the worse if the ideal result was to finish it fastest with the least suffering combined with a win for the democracies
General Mac Arthur backed by a US public badly in need of a hero after the disastrous showing of both the British and US forces against those of Japan is the quintessential example of personality overriding logic. He was appointed commander in chief of US forces in the south west area having under him half the number forces assigned to Italy, itself a minor theatre and at the same time wanted to be free of Admiral Nimitz who was his chief. He was often heard to voice the opinion that the two pronged approach was not the proper way to conduct the war on Japan. His force was based in the south west Pacific Nimitz in the northern areas island hopping to Japanese home islands.
After the loss of the Philippines he had set his heart on regaining them and with a cooperative press along with expectations of political office had built up a reputation quite undeserved as a talented general. His insistence upon taking the Philippines was criticized by many as a waste of time, a more profitable policy being that of by passing and letting it hang on the vines while concentrating upon going for the jugular and letting the Japanese garrison die of lack of supplies.
When the initial landing did occur there were few US casualties but there was cynicism from his own forces when he gave his famous speech upon landing. They encounter swamps up to their neck, equipment was improperly stored on ships causing it to be unloaded in a manner not conducive to the plan of operations;there were not enough men handling the unloading.
The main Japanese force had retired to the mountains, the US infantry on the plains constantly staffed by Japanese aircraft, Mac Arthur loath to ask Haley's third fleet for fighter cover. Eventually he had to anyway but not until after scores of American dead. Mac Arthur was known to be an unfeeling man from the time of the 1935 WWI veterans bonus march on Washington where he had dispersed it with water cannon and tear gas. When giving his senior officers instructions he had been known to order 'take the objective or come back in a body bag.'
Halsey's third fleet covered an area of nine miles by forty miles its air cover keeping Japanese fleet swinging at anchor while the army was doing all of the fighting. This was reversed with the Japanese deployment of squadrons from Borneo and Kyushu to rendezvous of Leyte Gulf in order to attack Mac Arthur’s forces and Kincaid’s covering fleet. This led to one of the closest near annihilations in USN history. The cause was Halsey’s over confidence and arrogance misjudging of a situationand thereby playing beautifully into the Japanese hands. 200 miles to the North West was positioned admiral Adowa's squadron flaunting his presence and having only half his complement of aircraft. He attacked Haley with indifferent results opening his eyes to his presence.
The next day a reconnaissance flight picked up Ozawa squadron causing Halsey to surmise that this was the main Japanese fleet. He launched air strikes causing great damage and sinking what were in effect decoy empty carriers. In the meantime the US submarine had reported to Halsey that five Japanese battleships and ten cruisers were heading to San Bernardino Strait.US submarines hit two cruisers with torpedoes. Halsey then ordered carrier strikes as he knew Leyte was mined and would not be able to operate their.Japanes ese land planes struck from Luzon, a Judy penetrating the fighter screen bombing the carrier Princeton. As Hasley had been able to strike all day at the Japanese fleet with no interference he concluded there were no Japanese carriers within range .Although out of 259 US air strikes only 43 caused damage the Japanese fleet reversed direction away from San Bernardino Straits. Halsey’s actions however had left Kincaid and Nimitz in danger as he had not given them any warning of his departure leaving both with no air cover.
Halsey's mule headed over confidence regarding the position of the main Japanese fleet was about to take an ugly turn.CVE's;Jerry built aircraft carriers, not really warships, more floating landing strips ;patrolling east of Leyte saw what they believed to be Halsey's warships but which were in fact the Japanese fleet sent out from Borneo and Kyuska.Taffy (task force)one, two, and three seemed about to be massacred and the reverse of the usual was in battle ships within spitting distance of aircraft carriers.Tafy three was the first to be spotted ,the other Taffies still behind and so far not within range .Taffy two attempted to reassure Taffy three that 'we are right behind you, don’t panic and do anything rash. There were shells whizzing over and close to the CVE's but no hits. There was return fire with the single .5 inch all carriers carried coring a hit on the bridge of an enemy ship .Miraculously the incoming multicolored spray used to identify position connected with any of the carriers Kurita now became apprehensive as he thought he was facing Halsey's third fleet and had reduced speed to ten knots while the Taffies formed a circle covered by destroyer escorts.
Miraculously a rain squall occurred giving them time to launch aircraft strikes. Japanese Battleships now unable to fire their main armament where hit by and cruisers were hit with destroyer torpedo attacks and then aircraft strikes. After two hours the Japanese fleet turned back; Kurita thinking he was in contact with Haley third.
Looking at the entire situation in the Pacific it soon is apparent that the navy policy of going of fighting a major sea battle to win wars was not the correct policy.Although sea battles were very spectacular and fullfiling Admiral Mahans victory at sea policy did not do mucn to change the over all situation. Neither was that of MacArthurs taking of the Philippines and going from there to Japan.Tens of thousands of soldiers were in order to put the B29'sof LeMays tenth airforce within range of Tokyo so as not to have to rely upon the bases in China which were getting pushed farther and farther back as the Japanes army advanced against the army of Chiang kai shek who offered only token resistence, his main concern the coming war with the forces of Mao tse Tung. The course of the Pacific resulted in horrendous casualties to all concerned, both US Japanese and civilians. It is estimated that in order to retake the Philippines alone it cost a million Filipino lives, seven thousand US and more than double that for the Japanese.
A less glamorous but more effective method would have been by blockade. The Japanese prewar merchant fleet had been 122,000 ships, of that number 116 were sunk by US submarines .During the latter part of 1944 Japan lost approximately 400,000 tons of shipping to US submarines. In the air war General Le May put great store in the firebombing of Japanese cities where most of the houses were of paper construction, the excuse being that these housed the workers of the armament factories .Towards the end of the war the Japanese merchant fleet confined itself to shallow waters in order to avoid US submarines leaving the field open to Le May's B29 equipped for mine laying. It was calculated that the small number of aircraft involved as Le May's was loath to reduce the firebombing produced this formulae: 9 sorties, 45 tons of bombs=1000 tons of shipping sunk.
It seems that even though the sea actions were spectacular with the loss of Japanese bases and aircraft carriers they battle ships were ineffectual as they were unable to close for action. The same was said of the Philippines and in fact of all of the Japanese overseas colonies. The cutting off of food and fuel would have eventually starved Japan into surrender but unfortunately with some many personalities with such great points to prove this was not to be. Not only at the individual level did personalities prove a hindrance but also at the command level .The USN was committed to decisive naval actions. Lemay was intent upon proving the worth of air power in order to create a separate service upon wars end; Mac Arthur intent in setting up his own empire in the Far East mirroring the one he had grown up in as a boy in the Philippines.
If the navy had been content to disrupt Japanese shipping once the Marianas had been taken they could have contributed to their submarine effort and greatly increased the speed at which Japan would have had to surrender it would have been much more humane if the Le May's twentieth air force had concentrated his efforts upon mining the Japanese home islands harbors rather that the fire bombing of Japanese4 civilians.It seems that in this scenario the army and the marines would have been at loose end as island hopping would have no longer been a factor in the war in the Pacific.The obvious thing to do with these troops would have been to ship to the European theatre.
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The Malayan Emergency of 1947 1960 was one of the least bloody wars of the twentieth century and one that had a victory in line with that required by the British Government, the defeat of the Malay Communist party. It was fought at time when there were no widely available ground to air missiles, the jet engine still a highly specialized instrument available only to the most advanced countries, and in a country isolated from its neighbours but for a small frontier connecting it to friendly Thailand. The origin of the conflict was in the Second World War. After the British defeat at the hands of the Japanese they left a small stay behind force so as to harass the Japanese. Within this force were a large number of Chinese communists who were very anti Japanese. With the ending of the war they took the position that they were instrumental in defeating the Japanese in Malaya and so were therefore entitled to form the government. The local people and the British took umbrage and so there began a period of union unrest (under the control of the former fighters). With crackdowns by the British this escalated into open violence and then upon warfare upon not only the British, but also upon the local Malay population who were never friendly with the Chinese settlers in the country anyway.
Grenade attacks on crowds and such like was the first order of the day which then escalated to attacks upon cars on lonely roads, outlaying rubber plantations and then police stations resulting in the British bringing in more troops. These early forces consisted in the main regiments from the brigade of guards and very eager to fight in order to regain what they thought of a loss of honour as some regiments had been confined to the UK for the duration of World War Two in reserve in case of a German invasion. Within a short time the Communist Terrorists (CT) had been pushed into the jungle where with the aid of the aboriginal Dyaks they not only managed to survive, albeit in a precarious fashion, they also were able to continue the war. In 1950 the British commander in chief Lieutenant General Biggs had introduced what was to become known as the ’Biggs plan', in an effort to not only to destroy CT units, but also to prevent them from reforming. He had commanded the 5th Indian Division in Burma from 1942 to 1945 acquiring much experience of Jungle Warfare. His plan to clear the country from south to north in a methodical manner cutting the MRLA(Malayan Races Liberation Army) off from its supporters and to force the insurgent fighters into the open. The main features of the plan were close coordination within the civil administration, police and military, co-ordination at all levels and resettlement of Chinese squatters. The army’s task was to clear an area and then hand it over to the police. There was also to be some re grouping of mine and rubber estate labour. Biggs implemented his plan on 1st June, 1950. Each of the resettlement of Squatters would establish a heavily guarded, well protected New Village. Each village guarded by a force of Special Constables until they were able to form their own Home Guard.
British and commonwealth troops now partook in anti guerrilla operations deep into the jungle hideouts. The first order of the day was to separate the CT’s from their Dyak allies. These Dyaks had no political beliefs beyond welfare of the tribal families. These families consisted of one hundred or so people all inter related .They had been told by the CTs that the British had been defeated by the Chinese in Korea and were now after retreating hiding in Malaya. In order to counter the British consulted the Malayan Museum of anthropology who advised on the best way to influence the Dyak’s not to support the guerrillas. Head men were invited on to British bases. They were shown the British soldier’s quarters, the dining halls and then an artillery piece firing across a valley onto a far hillside. They watched aircraft taking off and landing and the sight of troops dropping from parachutes. The British then offered them protection from the guerrillas for their groups and supplies The chiefs quickly agreed and so the CTs soon found themselves without supplies and living a hand to mouth existence. Law was were promulgated making it a capital offence to supply the CT’s with not only weapons but also food, anyone having food beyond the needs of their own families or trade charged under the emergency regulations with what was in some cases a capital offence as food, or rather the lack of it, was now a weapon of war
The war was conducted by small patrols never above company level and more often at platoon level. Jungle paths were avoided the route of the patrol usually alongside the trail unless they were absolutely sure that the area was CT free Informers and ambushes were the usual form of warfare as now the communist would avoid conventional combat. The discipline within the guerrilla camps was now so severe that men could be beaten or even executed for relatively trivial offences, sometime being buried alive. Many a deserter had betrayed his comrades to lead an attack upon his former comrades. It was a requirement of the British that when an ambush was mounted in which a former CT took part it was mandatory that he should take the first shot at his former comrades. In many cases the British soldiers were astounded by the hatred of these men towards their former comrades.
In December of '51 Operation JACKPOT was launched against the 2nd MRLA consisting roughly 250 fighters in areas of northern Negri Sembilan. Aircraft attacked guerrillas in areas where infantry ,due to the in hospitability of the terrain ,were unable to operate .Sorties were flown by Lincoln bombers backed up by twin fighter bomber Bristol Brigand, Spitfire, and Tempest aircraft driving the ‘gang’ as they were colloquially referred to in the press of the day, out of the jungle and into a rubber estate were men of the 1st Suffolk Regiment killed 29 of them , captured 10, and took the surrender of 5.Casualties however are not the only indication of success. Police reports indicated that later on as a direct result of the air attack, 32 CT's surrendered and 12 more were captured. These aircraft were found to be ideal for this type of warfare as they were originally designed as long range bombers, their range now converted to loiter time. It was found that the best way to chase these fighters out of the jungle was by the use of incendary bombs. These were hardly effectual against infantry in the jungle but what they did excel in was the igniting and knocking down of trees. Infantry can take air attack and survive if well dug in but where these aircraft excelled was in their ability to stay over the target for several hours dropping a few bombs at a time causing fires’ and crashing trees. These surreal affects would eventually drive those cowering in the jungle mad. However there was a way out. Before the attack army light aircraft would mount psychological warfare by announcing via airborne PA the coming raid and the escape route for those who wanted to defect.
Key to the effort was the finding of CT targets which was exceedingly difficult in the 200-foot high jungle. The SAS (Special Air Service) had just perfected the system of jumping onto the jungle canopy from a great and height and distance and then rappelling down to the ground. These men were dropped a great distance from their targets using steerable parachutes as even the slightest hint of aircraft would cause the CT’s to strike camp. When contact was made colour panels were placed a short distance away from the target giving the bombers a reference point. Sometimes a smoke marker was used. One method found to be highly effective was the placing of flares at a measured distance from the target on a time delay fuse allowing the party setting the flares time to escape. On a moon-lit night Lincoln's would form a five aircraft Vic formation dropping a pattern of explosives having loud detonation and visual effect, instantaneous and timed, the purpose being to panic rather than to cause casualties. On a dark night when no moon was visible a V pattern of three aircraft was used instead so as to avoid mid air collisions. It was found that to be effective it was necessary to stay over the target for at least three hours or more .While the bombing was going on twin engine Hornets and single engine Spitfires would attack road junctions and river crossing forcing the CT's ever deeper into the jungle.
In 1957 7,500 CT's were eliminated allowing for the setting up of the first 'white area’ where emergency regulations were lifted allowing for a semblance of normality .At this time the Canberra jet bomber was introduced which was a failure regarding jungle bombing as its short loiter time over the target negated the psychological factor. It had been found that key to the war on the CT's was the prolonged bombing accompanied by visual and sound effects. The CT'S eventually scattered to the Thai border where they were chased by the security forces northwards and then by the Thai's south again in a never ending yo yo motion. Although the war officially came to an end in 1959 the units of the CT's managed to hold out for decades leading a squalid in life in stinking encampments. Even ss late as 1965 units of the MRLA were being reported as being in the border region. In 1984 chin Peng, the leader of the insurgency, was finally captured and sentenced to life of incarceration. One of the terms of his imprisonment was that he undergoes a period of re-education, a twist on a theme begun during the Korean War where allied prisoners of war were subject to, among others things, harsh communist indoctrination methods.
